The Safer Way to Fail #
There is a pattern that shows up in workplaces, in classrooms, and in the way whole societies go about their business. Faced with a familiar method that has been producing middling or even poor results, and an untried alternative that might do better, people tend to keep the familiar method. It would be easy to put this down to inertia or a lack of imagination, but I think the explanation lies somewhere more specific, in the way we judge failure. A failure that comes from following the established way of doing things is treated quite differently from a failure that comes from trying something new. Once you look at how people hand out blame, responsibility, and credit, the preference for failing in the conventional way begins to look less like timidity and more like a reasonable response to how others are likely to judge the outcome.
What Changes When You Choose Differently #
When someone sets aside the customary approach, the departure itself tells observers that a decision was made. Following tradition rarely registers as a choice at all, since it looks like simply doing what is normally done. Departing from it, on the other hand, is visibly intentional, and it implies that the person believed they were in a position to steer the outcome. Both of these impressions matter a great deal to how blame is assigned. Cushman’s work on moral judgment found that people’s assessments of blame and punishment depend jointly on what a person intended and on what their action actually caused, so that a harmful outcome which can be traced to a deliberate choice draws considerably more blame than one which cannot (Cushman, 2008). Alicke’s account of blame makes a related point about control, holding that the more control we believe someone exercised over an outcome, the more responsible we consider them for it (Alicke, 2000). Someone who chose a new approach is understood to have been in control of that choice, whereas someone who followed tradition appears to have exercised very little discretion, and their accountability shrinks accordingly.
Guglielmo and Malle add a useful detail about how this judgment unfolds. When people learn of a bad outcome and set about deciding whom to blame, they tend to seek information in a fairly fixed order, asking first who or what caused it, then whether it was intentional, and then, if it was, what the person’s reasons were (Guglielmo & Malle, 2017). For our purposes, the last step is the important one. A person who follows tradition already has a reason that most observers accept without further inquiry, namely that this is how the thing is normally done. A person who departs from tradition has to supply reasons of their own, and if the outcome is bad, those reasons will be examined with the benefit of hindsight.
What makes that examination especially unforgiving is that a decision is rarely judged on its own terms. Baron and Hershey found that people rate the quality of a decision, and the competence of the person who made it, according to how it turned out, even when they know everything the decision-maker knew at the time and the outcome depended on chance (Baron & Hershey, 1988). A well-reasoned experiment that happens to fail is therefore likely to be remembered as a bad decision, and since it was the innovator’s decision in a way that the traditional choice is nobody’s in particular, the poor judgment is attributed to them.
The consequence is that two identical failures can be read in very different ways. If the person who tried something new fails, the failure is traced back to their decision and becomes theirs. If the person who followed the usual practice fails, the failure tends to be attributed to circumstances, or to the limits of the practice itself, and the person is seen as having done what anyone in their position would have done.
Why the Unusual Choice Is Easier to Undo in Hindsight #
Kahneman and Miller’s norm theory offers a deeper account of why the departure from custom attracts so much attention after the fact. Their argument is that we judge an outcome partly by comparing it with the alternatives that come readily to mind, and that the alternatives which come most readily to mind are those in which something unusual is replaced by something normal (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). When an outcome follows from an exceptional choice, it is very easy to imagine the person having made the ordinary choice instead and avoided the trouble, and this easily imagined alternative intensifies both the regret the person feels and the blame others direct at them. When the same outcome follows from a routine choice, the alternative is much harder to picture, because there was nothing out of the ordinary to undo.
Kahneman and Tversky illustrated this with a simple example about two investors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The first kept their shares in one company, having considered switching to another, and later found that they would have been better off had they switched. The second did switch, and later found that they would have been better off staying put. Both lost exactly the same amount, yet the great majority of people asked about the case judged that the second investor, who had acted, would feel worse. The same reasoning applies with even more force to tradition, since the traditional approach is not merely the option that requires no action but the one that most people regard as normal. Abandoning it creates exactly the kind of exceptional decision that hindsight finds easiest to undo, and so any failure that follows is experienced, by the person and by those who judge them, as something that need not have happened.
Why Failure Is Noticed More Than Success #
The second part of the explanation has to do with the fact that we do not weigh good and bad outcomes evenly. Studies of how people judge one another have repeatedly found that blame is assigned more readily than praise, and that a negative outcome prompts a much more careful search for its causes than a positive one does (Alicke, 2000; Pizarro et al., 2003).
For anyone considering a new approach, this makes the arithmetic unfavourable. If the experiment succeeds, the recognition it earns is likely to be modest, and may even be put down to luck or favourable conditions. If it fails, it will be examined closely, and the examination will lead back to the person who proposed it. So even when an innovation has a genuinely higher expected payoff, the risk it carries is more visible to others than the reward, and the person weighing it up is usually well aware of this.
Responsibility Spread Across a System #
A further factor is how responsibility gets shared out. Darley and Latané’s work on the diffusion of responsibility showed that when many people are involved in a situation, each of them feels a smaller share of the responsibility for what happens (Darley & Latané, 1968). Their research concerned bystanders in emergencies, but the same logic extends to traditions, which are in effect decisions made by a great many people over a long period of time. When a traditional method fails, the responsibility is spread across everyone who developed, endorsed, and continued to use it, as well as the institutions that preserved it. When a novel method fails, there is usually one person or a small group to whom it can be traced, and a failure carried by many is far easier for any one of them to absorb than a failure carried alone.
The Role of Loss Aversion #
Finally, prospect theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, established that losses are felt more sharply than gains of the same size (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Applied to the choice between the familiar and the new, the damage to one’s reputation from a failed experiment tends to loom much larger in the mind than the credit that might come from a successful one. Staying with tradition allows any failure that follows to be framed as unfortunate but expected, rather than as the consequence of a risky decision one personally chose to make, and given how heavily losses weigh, that framing is worth a great deal to the person making the choice.
When Tradition Stops Being Safe #
All of this might suggest that tradition always offers cover, but norm theory itself points to an important limit. What counts as normal depends on the circumstances, and the protection that tradition provides depends on its continuing to be regarded as the normal choice. Zeelenberg and colleagues found that the familiar pattern, in which people regret their actions more than their failures to act, reverses after a run of poor results (Zeelenberg et al., 2002). In one of their scenarios, two football coaches had both lost their previous match, and both lost again; the coach who had kept the same team was judged likely to feel more regret than the coach who had changed it. Once earlier outcomes have been bad, doing something different becomes the expected response, and persisting with the old approach becomes the exceptional choice that hindsight finds easy to undo.
This qualifies the argument considerably. Tradition shelters people from blame only for as long as its failures can be read as ordinary misfortune. Once those failures become frequent or visible enough that a change is widely expected, the person who keeps to the old way finds that they own the failure just as fully as an innovator would. It may also help explain why organizations so often change course only after a crisis, since a crisis is what turns the new approach into the expected one, and it is only at that point that trying it stops being the riskier choice for the person who has to make it.
Putting It Together #
Taken together, these findings describe a fairly stable pattern. Deliberate actions attract more blame when they go wrong, and decisions tend to be judged by their outcomes, so a failed experiment is remembered as a bad decision by the person who chose it. The more a decision departs from what is considered normal, the more easily others can imagine it having been made differently. Negative outcomes are judged more severely than positive ones are rewarded. Trying something new concentrates responsibility on the person who tried it, whereas following tradition spreads that responsibility across a whole system of people and institutions. Loss aversion then magnifies the downside of experimenting relative to its potential benefits. What people are avoiding, when they stick with a method that is not working, is often less the failure itself than the prospect of being the one who has to own it, and that holds until the old method has failed often enough that sticking with it becomes the choice others find hard to excuse.
Why This Matters #
If experimentation is discouraged in this way, the cause has less to do with any careful weighing of its merits than with the way we assign blame, and that affects how readily any group can improve on what it already does. Encouraging people to try new approaches therefore depends on more than offering incentives or resources. It depends on changing how failure is interpreted, so that a failed experiment is treated as a source of information about what does not work rather than as evidence of personal fault. For as long as that interpretation stays as it is, the traditional way of doing things will keep its particular advantage, which is that it allows people to fail without the failure being held against them.
References #
- Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 556–574.
- Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988). Outcome bias in decision evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(4), 569–579.
- Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108(2), 353–380.
- Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 377–383.
- Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2017). Information-acquisition processes in moral judgments of blame. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(7), 957–971.
- Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136–153.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The psychology of preferences. Scientific American, 246(1), 160–173.
- Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetry in judgments of moral blame and praise. Psychological Science, 14(3), 267–272.
- Zeelenberg, M., van den Bos, K., van Dijk, E., & Pieters, R. (2002). The inaction effect in the psychology of regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(3), 314–327.