↓ Skip to main content

Risk, Tightness, and the Social Cushion in India

Table of Contents

A Cautious Country, or a Tight One?
#

Anyone who has spent time around middle-class families in India will recognise a familiar way of talking about careers and money, in which a secure salaried post is spoken of with something close to reverence, and a young person who announces that they are leaving one to start something of their own is met with more worry than encouragement. It is tempting to sum this up by saying that contemporary India is a risk-averse society, and the summary is not entirely wrong, but when the evidence is set out carefully it turns out to be wrong in a way that is more interesting than the summary itself. The caution that shows up in the data is directed less at uncertainty in general than at a particular kind of exposure, namely the prospect of failing while doing something that others would not have done. Keynes, writing about the investor who goes against average opinion, put the underlying asymmetry about as plainly as it can be put when he observed that “worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” (Keynes, 1936). In an earlier post I looked at the psychological mechanisms behind that asymmetry. Here I want to ask what happens to them in a society where the conventional path is unusually well defined and where the family, rather than the state, is the main source of help when things go wrong.


What the Culture Indices Actually Show
#

The most widely used measure of how a culture deals with the unknown is Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance dimension, and on it India does not look especially cautious. The current scores published by The Culture Factor Group, which now hosts the Hofstede data, give India 40, a little below the United States at 46 and well below Germany at 65 and France at 86, with only the United Kingdom, at 35, scoring lower among the countries I compared (The Culture Factor Group, n.d.). The site’s own description of India stresses improvisation, remarking that “rules are often there to be worked around through innovative means”. The GLOBE study points in the same direction. In its aggregated societal culture data, India’s score for uncertainty avoidance as it is actually practised is 4.15 on a seven-point scale, which is practically identical to the score for the United States and very close to the mean of the 62 societies in the study (GLOBE Project, n.d.).

Where India does stand apart in both datasets is in how closely people are bound to their groups. Its current individualism score on the Hofstede measure is 24, against 60 for the United States, and the accompanying description notes that the opinion of family, extended family, neighbours and colleagues “shapes individual action” and that “to be rejected by one’s in-group is deeply painful”. On GLOBE’s measure of in-group collectivism as practised, India ranks fourth of the 62 societies by my count, far above the United States, England, Germany and France, all of which sit near the bottom of the list.

Measures based on behaviour rather than on questionnaires complicate the picture further. In l’Haridon and Vieider’s comparison of incentivised choices between lotteries in 30 countries, poorer countries were on average “substantially more risk tolerant than rich countries”, while India was placed alongside Germany, Australia and the United States among the countries with the highest values on the parameter that captures pessimism about gambles (l’Haridon & Vieider, 2019). With real money at stake in a laboratory task, then, the Indian students in that study behaved much like students in rich Western countries, and no more cautiously. The one large survey that does seem to place India clearly at the cautious end is the Global Preference Survey, which combines a lottery task with a self-assessment of willingness to take risks (Falk et al., 2018). On the paper’s own map of risk taking, India falls in the band between 0.35 and 0.25 standard deviations below the world average, which places it below the United States and most of Western Europe, although not below Portugal, and the authors themselves note that “Western European countries are notable for being relatively risk averse” as a group. None of this should be surprising, since risk attitudes are known to be highly specific to the domain in which they are measured, so that a person may be consistently cautious in one area of life without being so in another (Weber et al., 2002). The more useful question is therefore which kind of risk Indians seem reluctant to take.


Seeing the Opportunity and Fearing the Failure
#

The clearest answer comes from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, which asks adults whether they see good opportunities to start a business where they live, and then asks those who do whether fear of failure would prevent them from starting one. In the 2024 survey, India ranked second of 51 economies on the share of adults who saw good opportunities, second on the share who felt they had the skills and knowledge to start a business, and second on the share who thought starting one was easy, and yet it ranked first on the share of opportunity-perceivers who said that fear of failure would stop them (GEM, 2025). The national report for the year before shows the same pairing, with India second in the world both on perceived opportunity and on fear of failure (Shukla et al., 2025).

I would rely on the ranks here more than on the percentages. Indian respondents agree with nearly every statement the survey puts to them at very high rates, including every one of the motives offered for starting a business, and I suspect that some of this reflects a general tendency to agree with survey statements rather than anything specific to the question being asked. Even allowing for that, the combination is difficult to explain away. The people in question believe that the opportunity exists and that they are capable of taking it, so their hesitation does not seem to come from doubts about whether a venture could work. It seems to come from what failing would mean for them, and that is precisely the territory of the earlier post.


Tightness and the Cost of Deviating
#

A measure built specifically around the cost of departing from what others expect makes the pattern clearer still. Gelfand and colleagues distinguished cultures that are “tight (have many strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior)” from those that are “loose (have weak social norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior)”, and in their study of 33 nations India came out as the third tightest, with a score of 11.0 against a mean of 6.5 and a score of 5.1 for the United States, exceeded only by Pakistan and Malaysia (Gelfand et al., 2011). The same study found that people in tight nations had higher scores on cautiousness, in the sense of being concerned with avoiding mistakes, and that everyday situations in those nations placed more constraint on how people could behave. The Indian sample was small, 222 people in four cities, about half of them students, so the score is better read as an indication than as a precise measurement. A related study of creative work found that people from tight cultures were less likely to take on and succeed at creative tasks set in foreign settings, but that tightness could actually help creative success when the work was done in their own or culturally close countries (Chua et al., 2015). That is a finding about creativity rather than about money, but it has the same shape as the argument I am going to make, in which a tight culture discourages venturing into unfamiliar territory while leaving familiar territory relatively safe.

Read together, these measures suggest that what India is unusually cautious about is deviation. Its people are not, on the standard indices, more troubled by uncertainty than Americans or Europeans, but they live in one of the most tightly normed societies in the world, they are strongly embedded in their in-groups, and those among them who see an opportunity are, more often than anywhere else surveyed, deterred by the thought of being the one who fails.


The Earlier Mechanisms in a Tight Culture
#

The earlier post argued that a failure which follows from an unconventional choice is judged more harshly than one which follows from tradition, because the unusual choice is easy to undo in hindsight, because it marks the outcome as the chooser’s own doing, and because a traditional practice spreads responsibility across everyone who upheld it. I will not repeat those arguments here, but it is worth noticing what tightness does to each of them. Norm theory holds that an outcome is judged against the alternatives that come most readily to mind, and that the alternative which comes most readily is the one in which the abnormal element is replaced by the normal one. In a tight culture the range of what counts as normal is narrower and more widely agreed upon, so a departure from it is more conspicuous, the counterfactual of having done the expected thing is more vivid, and the failure that follows is more easily attributed to the person who departed.

The diffusion of responsibility works in the same direction. When a career or a business decision has been approved by parents, elders and the wider community, a bad outcome is in a real sense the outcome of a shared decision, and the blame for it is distributed among everyone who endorsed the choice. When the decision was taken against their advice, there is no one to share it with. Work comparing North American and Chinese observers has found that other cultures often locate agency in collectives rather than in individual persons (Morris et al., 2001), and that tendency would, if it applies in India, make the sharing of responsibility for an approved choice all the easier.

There is one complication that I should state openly. Miller found that older American participants explained behaviour with more reference to general dispositions and less reference to context than Hindu participants did (Miller, 1984). That could mean that Indian observers are less inclined to blame individuals in general, which would cut against the idea that failure lands heavily on the person who chose. The argument here needs the narrower claim that it is specifically the exceptional choice which gets pinned on the individual, while conventional choices are read through context and circumstance. That claim follows naturally from norm theory, but I have not found a study that tests it with Indian participants.


The Cushion That Should Make People Bolder
#

The Cushion Hypothesis
#

There is a well-known line of research that, taken at face value, predicts exactly the opposite of what the GEM figures show. Hsee and Weber compared American and Chinese students and found that the Chinese students were significantly more willing to take financial risks, even though both groups predicted the reverse (Hsee & Weber, 1999). Their explanation, which they called the cushion hypothesis, is that people in a collectivist society are more likely to receive financial help if they get into difficulty, so that they could be “cushioned” if they fell, and the adverse outcome of a risky choice is correspondingly less severe for them. The help they had in mind was material rather than emotional, the kind that “one can usually receive only from family members and close friends”, and the measures in the study bore this out. The Chinese students named nearly twice as many people they could approach for financial help, while the two groups did not differ in the number of people they could turn to for emotional support, and once the size of this financial network was taken into account, nationality no longer predicted risk-taking. Weber and Hsee tested a related prediction in four countries and found that the rank order of the countries’ collectivism matched the rank order of how risky their students perceived financial options to be, describing collectivism as acting “as a cushion against possible losses” (Weber & Hsee, 1998). Later work has found support for the hypothesis within China using incentivised tasks (Chew et al., 2023), and in the weaker link between material hardship and financial well-being in South Korea and Taiwan (Warmath et al., 2021). None of these studies included Indian participants.

If India is one of the most collectivist societies in these datasets, the cushion hypothesis would seem to predict that Indians should be bolder with money than Westerners, and the GEM figures suggest that, at least when it comes to starting a business, they are more hesitant. I do not think this tension can be dismissed, and I do not think the cushion hypothesis can simply be cited as if it explained Indian caution, because on its face it predicts the reverse.


The Authors’ Own Caveat
#

The way out of the tension is suggested by the originators of the hypothesis themselves. In a later paper, Weber and Hsee summarised it as holding that members of collectivist cultures “can afford to take greater financial risks, since their social networks ensure them against catastrophic outcomes, but for the same reason, need to use greater caution when it comes to social risks” (Weber & Hsee, 1999). The network that absorbs a financial loss is only available to someone who remains in good standing with it, and anything that threatens that standing is therefore more dangerous to a person who depends on the network than to one who does not. Mandel found the same split experimentally. Participants whose interdependent selves had been brought to mind were more willing to take financial risks and less willing to take social risks than participants whose independent selves had been brought to mind, and in both cases the effect was mediated by the size of their social network (Mandel, 2003).

The original study also contains a detail that is suggestive, though it cannot settle anything. Alongside the financial choice, Hsee and Weber asked participants whether they would write an essay on a conservative topic, whose grade they could predict, or on a provocative topic, whose grade could turn out higher or lower. On this choice the Chinese and American students did not differ at all. The authors explained the null result in terms of domain, since family and friends cannot easily help someone who receives a poor grade, and that explanation is entirely reasonable. But the one task in the study that set a conventional option against an unconventional one is also the one where the cushion disappeared, and because domain and conventionality were confounded in the design, the study cannot tell us which of the two was responsible.


A Hypothesis: The Cushion Follows the Norm
#

What I want to propose is that the network cushions a risk according to how socially sanctioned or normal it is, and much less according to how large it is. A substantial risk taken inside an established setup, such as expanding the family’s trade, buying land, or entering a business where the community already has a foothold, is the kind of risk the network has an interest in protecting, and a failure there is a shared failure that the network absorbs. A radical departure, such as leaving a secure post to found a company in a field the family has never worked in, carries a smaller cushion or none at all, because taking it is itself a social risk of exactly the kind Weber and Hsee had in mind. This would reconcile the cushion hypothesis with the GEM figures, since an Indian with a strong network could be bold within the sanctioned range while being unusually afraid of the failures that fall outside it. I should be clear that this step, from “social risks are costlier for collectivists” to “an unconventional financial choice is itself a social risk”, is my own inference and is not something the cushion literature claims.


Networks That Hold People in Place
#

Several strands of Indian evidence fit this picture, even though none of them tests it directly. The most striking comes from Munshi and Rosenzweig, who explain the low rate of male migration in India and the large gap between rural and urban wages in terms of caste-based rural insurance networks (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2016). These networks smooth their members’ consumption when times are bad, but a member who migrates loses access to them, so that, as their model predicts and their data confirm, men in households facing greater rural income risk, who benefit more from the insurance, migrate less. Their structural estimates suggest that even small improvements in formal insurance would substantially increase migration. This is a cushion that is conditional on staying within reach of the network, shown for migration rather than for careers or ventures, but it has precisely the structure I am proposing.

Munshi’s study of the Indian diamond export industry shows the other side of the same coin (Munshi, 2011). The business end of the industry was long dominated by the Marwari and Palanpuri communities, until a supply shock in the late 1970s allowed firms from the Kathiawari community, who had previously done the cutting and polishing, to enter the trade. Diamonds are bought and sold on credit, and the Kathiawari network came to supply its members with connections to buyers and sellers, as well as credit, which is what a businessman would otherwise have provided to his son. Although 70% of the Kathiawaris who entered the industry in 1970 reported that their father was a businessman, that share fell below 20% by 2000, which means that the community’s network was carrying increasingly inexperienced entrants into a capital-intensive and credit-dependent trade. The risk involved was large, but it was taken inside the industry where the network was concentrated. In a similar vein, Banerjee and Munshi found large and systematic differences in capital stock between knitwear firms in Tirupur owned by members of two different communities, differences they argue cannot be explained by productivity alone and most likely reflect the communities’ different access to capital (Banerjee & Munshi, 2004). Munshi has since argued, in an accessible review, that community networks of this kind are active throughout the developing world and can support the mobility of whole groups (Munshi, 2014).

The GEM data add a further piece. In both of the years I looked at, India ranked first in the world on the share of early-stage entrepreneurs who said they had started their business to continue a family tradition (GEM, 2025; Shukla et al., 2025). The same caution about the level of agreement applies here, but the rank is consistent with a pattern in which the ventures that do get started are unusually often extensions of an existing line. Household portfolios may tell a similar story. According to the Reserve Bank of India’s Household Finance Committee, the average Indian household holds 77% of its assets in real estate, 7% in other durable goods and 11% in gold, leaving only 5% in financial assets (Household Finance Committee, 2017). A portfolio concentrated in a single illiquid asset is hardly free of risk, but it is the conventional way of holding wealth, and it fits the idea that what households avoid is the unusual risk rather than risk as such. Finally, outside India, Karapetian and colleagues found that participants switched to a risky option earlier when they were told that a large majority of a large group of others had chosen it in the past (Karapetian et al., 2025). That is evidence about conformity rather than about support or blame, but it shows that making a risk look normal can change willingness to take it while the gamble itself stays the same.


What Has Not Been Tested
#

All of this is consistent with the hypothesis, but none of it establishes it. As far as I have been able to find, no study has held the size of a financial risk constant while varying how conventional, sanctioned or family-approved the risky option is, and then measured either the support a network would offer or the blame it would assign. Every study of the cushion hypothesis I found defines the cushion by domain, financial or otherwise, and by the size of the network, and none of them included Indian participants. The evidence from India shows where network support goes, but it does not show that support is withheld from unconventional ventures of the same size.

A study that could test the idea would not be difficult to design. Participants in India could be presented with a relative facing a venture that carries the same expected loss in every version, varying only in whether the venture extends the family’s existing trade or enters a field the family has never worked in, and asked how willing they would be to lend money beforehand or to help after a failure, and how much they would blame the relative if it failed. An incentivised version could put real money behind the lending decision. If support and blame moved with the conventionality of the venture while its size was fixed, the hypothesis would gain a great deal, and if they did not, it would be in serious trouble.


Family, Careers, and the Missing Safety Net
#

The Preference for a Government Job
#

The career choices of young Indians show the same pull towards the most sanctioned path. In a 2016 survey of 6,122 people aged 15 to 34 across 19 states, Lokniti and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies found that 65% would prefer a government job if given a choice, with setting up their own business a distant second at 19% and a private sector job at 7% (Kumar, 2017). The preference had increased slightly since 2007, and among graduates it had risen from 54% to 73%, while among young people in big cities it had risen from 48% to 62%. The report also found that “preference for a government job goes up significantly with greater parental influence on decisions about career/education”, and that 65% of the young people surveyed were living with their parents. These are cross-sectional associations, and they do not show that parental influence causes the preference, but they fit the idea that the more say the family has, the more the choice gravitates towards the option that no one will have to explain.


The State’s Share of the Cushion
#

The cushion matters more when there is little else to fall back on. India enacted its Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in May 2016, which the World Bank described as set to “overhaul the 60-year-old framework for company liquidation” (World Bank, n.d.-a), and by the World Bank’s 2020 assessment India ranked 52nd on resolving insolvency, with a recovery rate of 71.6 cents on the dollar and a typical resolution time of 1.6 years (World Bank, n.d.-b). Those figures, however, concern companies rather than individuals, and they say little about what failure costs a founder who has personally guaranteed the loans of the business or who runs it as a sole proprietor.

The comparative evidence suggests that this matters. Across fifteen countries in Europe and North America, Armour and Cumming found that bankruptcy law had “a statistically and economically significant effect on self-employment rates” (Armour & Cumming, 2008), and within the United States, Fan and White found that households were 35% more likely to own businesses in states with unlimited rather than low bankruptcy exemptions (Fan & White, 2003). Simmons and colleagues, using cross-country data, found that where the stigma of business failure was strongest, entrepreneurs who had exited failed businesses were less likely to start again (Simmons et al., 2014). I did not find a peer-reviewed measure of failure stigma specific to India, so I cannot say where India stands on that dimension. What the comparative evidence does suggest is that the less of the downside the state is prepared to absorb, the more the question of what the family is willing to insure comes to matter.


Where the Argument Is Weaker
#

Capital Constraints
#

The strongest alternative explanation does not involve blame or norms at all. Banerjee and Duflo, studying a directed lending programme, concluded that many Indian firms “must have been severely credit constrained, and that the marginal rate of return to capital was very high for these firms” (Banerjee & Duflo, 2014). If formal credit is scarce, ventures will tend to happen where informal community credit is available, and community credit will tend to stay in trades the community understands, simply because lenders there can judge borrowers, monitor them, and value their collateral. That account predicts much of the same pattern as mine, including the concentration of business in community trades that Banerjee and Munshi documented, without any appeal to how failure is judged. I think the two explanations are complementary rather than rival, since a network’s judgement of what is sensible and its judgement of what is creditworthy are hard to separate in practice, but a purely economic account of information and monitoring could explain a good deal of the evidence on its own, and I cannot rule it out with what I have.


Necessity Rather Than Choice
#

The argument also has a limited scope. In the 2024 GEM survey, 90% of Indian early-stage entrepreneurs agreed that they had started their business “to earn a living because jobs are scarce”, which placed India sixth of 51 economies on that motive (GEM, 2025). A great many Indians bear substantial income risk through self-employment that they did not choose in any meaningful sense, and to describe them as risk-averse would be absurd. Everything I have said applies to people who have a safe option and are deciding whether to leave it, which in practice means the educated and the middle class, and it should be read with that restriction in mind.


Those Without a Cushion
#

Nor does everyone have a network to fall back on. Iyer, Khanna and Varshney found that scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are significantly under-represented in the ownership of enterprises, that these differences are widespread across all states and decreased only modestly between 1990 and 2005, and that they “cannot be attributed to broad differences in access to physical or human capital” (Iyer et al., 2013). Whose risk counts as normal is therefore structured by caste. For a family from a traditional trading community, starting a business may be the conventional path, while for a family that has historically been excluded from business networks there may be no cushion for any venture, conventional or otherwise. Entrepreneurship also varies a great deal across Indian districts, and Ghani, Kerr and O’Connell found that the quality of physical infrastructure and the education of the workforce were the strongest predictors of entry, with labour laws and household access to banking also playing a part (Ghani et al., 2014). India is not a single risk culture, and an argument pitched at the level of the country inevitably smooths over these differences.


Families That Do Enter New Industries
#

A further difficulty is that established Indian business families are well known for moving into industries they have never worked in. Khanna and Palepu found that affiliates of the most diversified Indian business groups outperformed unaffiliated firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and the existence of such groups shows that established families do take on unfamiliar domains. If “normal” were defined by industry, this would count against the hypothesis. I think it has to be defined socially instead, so that a family group extending itself into a new sector remains the family business expanding, with the family’s sanction behind it, while a son or daughter leaving to found an unrelated company does not. The Kathiawari case in Munshi’s study points the same way, because diamond trading was new to that community in the 1970s and became, within a generation, the path along which its network carried new entrants. Munshi also notes that a new business class active across diverse industries has emerged in post-colonial India from certain agricultural subcastes and from subcastes that had historically dominated the bureaucracy and the white-collar professions (Munshi, 2011). What counts as normal is set at the level of the community, and it can move. That makes the hypothesis more flexible, but it also makes it harder to test, since a sufficiently loose definition of “normal” could accommodate almost any result.


The Diaspora and the Problem of Selection
#

The figures on Indian founders abroad are tempting to use as evidence. Indian immigrants founded 26% of the immigrant-founded engineering and technology companies started in the United States between 1995 and 2005 (Wadhwa et al., 2007), a share that rose to 33.2% for companies founded between 2006 and 2012 (Wadhwa et al., 2012), and India is now the leading country of origin for immigrant founders of American startups valued at a billion dollars or more, with 96 such companies (Anderson, 2026). It is natural to read this as a sign that people who are cautious at home become bold once they are out of reach of the home network’s judgement and inside a looser culture where founding a company is a normal path for an engineer. But the people who reach the United States are a highly selected group. Chakravorty, Kapur and Singh, in their study of Indians in America, describe what they call a “triple selection”: “First, India’s social hierarchies and historic discriminations selected certain groups like Brahmins and other ‘high’ or ‘dominant’ castes for education”, then “the rationing of seats in higher education enabled a high-stakes, examination-based selection from within the already-selected group”, and finally “the U.S. immigration system selected within this doubly-selected group when it favored skills, especially skills in engineering and technology” (Chakravorty et al., 2017). A population filtered three times in this way cannot serve as a natural experiment on what happens to ordinary people once they leave the home network, and the most I would claim for the diaspora figures is that they are suggestive.


Two Smaller Doubts
#

Two further findings temper the argument. Gilovich and colleagues found that respondents in China, Japan and Russia, like those in the United States, tended in the long term to regret inactions more than actions (Gilovich et al., 2003), which suggests that the blame asymmetry on which the argument rests may be a short-run phenomenon, and that the person who stays on the safe path may come to regret it more than they would have regretted a failed departure. And the GEM figures that carry so much of the weight here come from a survey in which Indian respondents agree with almost everything, which is why I have leaned on ranks and contrasts and would not want any conclusion to depend on the level of a single percentage.


When the Normal Path Moves
#

The earlier post ended with the observation that tradition protects people only for as long as its failures can be read as ordinary misfortune. Zeelenberg and colleagues found that after poor prior outcomes, inaction comes to seem more abnormal, and more regret is attributed to the person who failed to change course (Zeelenberg et al., 2002). Landier’s model of entrepreneurship and the stigma of failure makes a related point at the level of a whole society, describing a conservative equilibrium in which failed entrepreneurs face a high cost of capital and an experimental equilibrium in which good entrepreneurs are more willing to start again (Landier, 2005). It is tempting to tell the story of India since the liberalisation of 1991, and of the startup wave of the last decade, as a slow shift from the first equilibrium towards the second, in which repeated disappointments with the old path gradually made departures from it look normal enough to be cushioned.

The evidence I have does not support that story with any confidence. I found no study that measures a change in Indian attitudes to risk across 1991 or across the period of the startup boom. The GEM fear-of-failure figures for India were second in the world in 2023 and first in 2024, with no sign of decline in the years I could verify. And the Lokniti survey found that the preference for a government job rose among graduates and big-city youth between 2007 and 2016, the very groups one would expect to be most drawn to a new path, leading its authors to remark that “two and a half decades after embarking on a programme of economic liberalisation, India’s enchantment with the post-colonial state remains puzzlingly undiminished” (Kumar, 2017). One possible reading, which is my own and which I cannot test with these data, is that founding a startup has become a normal and therefore cushioned path for a narrow and well-connected segment of educated Indians, while the median graduate has moved towards the most conventional option available. Whether that is right, and whether the cushion that families extend to the startup path is now growing because the path itself is becoming normal, are questions that the kind of study described above could begin to answer, and I would very much like to see someone attempt it.


References
#

  • Anderson, S. (2026, June). Immigrants and U.S. billion-dollar companies. NFAP Policy Brief. National Foundation for American Policy.
  • Armour, J., & Cumming, D. (2008). Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship. American Law and Economics Review, 10(2), 303–350.
  • Banerjee, A., & Munshi, K. (2004). How efficiently is capital allocated? Evidence from the knitted garment industry in Tirupur. Review of Economic Studies, 71(1), 19–42.
  • Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2014). Do firms want to borrow more? Testing credit constraints using a directed lending program. The Review of Economic Studies, 81(2), 572–607.
  • Chakravorty, S., Kapur, D., & Singh, N. (2017). The other one percent: Indians in America. Oxford University Press.
  • Chew, S. H., Ebstein, R. P., & Lu, Y. (2023). Rice culture and the cushion hypothesis: Experimental evidence from incentivized risk taking tasks. Economics Letters, 223, 110967.
  • Chua, R. Y. J., Roth, Y., & Lemoine, J.-F. (2015). The impact of culture on creativity: How cultural tightness and global orientation affect creative work. Administrative Science Quarterly, 60(2), 189–227.
  • Falk, A., Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Enke, B., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2018). Global evidence on economic preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(4), 1645–1692.
  • Fan, W., & White, M. J. (2003). Personal bankruptcy and the level of entrepreneurial activity. The Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2), 543–567.
  • Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., … Yamaguchi, S. (2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. Science, 332(6033), 1100–1104.
  • GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor). (2025). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2024/2025 global report: Entrepreneurship reality check. London: GEM.
  • Ghani, E., Kerr, W. R., & O’Connell, S. (2014). Spatial determinants of entrepreneurship in India. Regional Studies, 48(6), 1071–1089.
  • Gilovich, T., Wang, R. F., Regan, D., & Nishina, S. (2003). Regrets of action and inaction across cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34(1), 61–71.
  • GLOBE Project. (n.d.). GLOBE Phase 2 aggregated societal culture data [Data set].
  • Household Finance Committee. (2017). Report of the Household Finance Committee. Reserve Bank of India.
  • Hsee, C. K., & Weber, E. U. (1999). Cross-national differences in risk preference and lay predictions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12(2), 165–179.
  • Iyer, L., Khanna, T., & Varshney, A. (2013). Caste and entrepreneurship in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(6), 52–60.
  • Karapetian, A., Sundali, J., Guerrero, F., Hanna, A., & Ridinger, G. (2025). Risk aversion and social influence. Experimental Economics, 28(3), 550–575.
  • Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money, Chapter 12.
  • Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 867–891.
  • Kumar, S. (Principal Investigator). (2017). Attitudes, anxieties and aspirations of India’s youth: Changing patterns. Lokniti–Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
  • Landier, A. (2005). Entrepreneurship and the stigma of failure. SSRN Working Paper.
  • l’Haridon, O., & Vieider, F. M. (2019). All over the map: A worldwide comparison of risk preferences. Quantitative Economics, 10(1), 185–215.
  • Mandel, N. (2003). Shifting selves and decision making: The effects of self-construal priming on consumer risk-taking. Journal of Consumer Research, 30(1), 30–40.
  • Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and the development of everyday social explanation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(5), 961–978.
  • Morris, M. W., Menon, T., & Ames, D. R. (2001). Culturally conferred conceptions of agency: A key to social perception of persons, groups, and other actors. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(2), 169–182.
  • Munshi, K. (2011). Strength in numbers: Networks as a solution to occupational traps. The Review of Economic Studies, 78(3), 1069–1101.
  • Munshi, K. (2014). Community networks and the process of development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4), 49–76.
  • Munshi, K., & Rosenzweig, M. (2016). Networks and misallocation: Insurance, migration, and the rural-urban wage gap. American Economic Review, 106(1), 46–98.
  • Shukla, S., Bharti, P., & Dwivedi, A. K. (2025). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor India report 2023/24: A national study on entrepreneurship. Routledge.
  • Simmons, S. A., Wiklund, J., & Levie, J. (2014). Stigma and business failure: Implications for entrepreneurs’ career choices. Small Business Economics, 42(3), 485–505.
  • The Culture Factor Group. (n.d.). Country comparison tool. Retrieved 27 October 2026.
  • Wadhwa, V., Saxenian, A., Rissing, B., & Gereffi, G. (2007). America’s new immigrant entrepreneurs (Part I). Duke University / UC Berkeley; Kauffman Foundation.
  • Wadhwa, V., Saxenian, A., & Siciliano, F. D. (2012). Then and now: America’s new immigrant entrepreneurs, Part VII. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.
  • Warmath, D., Chen, P.-J., Grable, J., & Kwak, E. J. (2021). Soft landings: Extending the cushion hypothesis to financial well-being in collectivistic cultures. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 55(4), 1563–1590.
  • Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15(4), 263–290.
  • Weber, E. U., & Hsee, C. (1998). Cross-cultural differences in risk perception, but cross-cultural similarities in attitudes towards perceived risk. Management Science, 44(9), 1205–1217.
  • Weber, E. U., & Hsee, C. K. (1999). Models and mosaics: Investigating cross-cultural differences in risk perception and risk preference. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(4), 611–617.
  • World Bank. (n.d.-a). Doing Business 2016/17 [Mini-book].
  • World Bank. (n.d.-b). Doing Business 2020: India economy profile.
  • Zeelenberg, M., van den Bos, K., van Dijk, E., & Pieters, R. (2002). The inaction effect in the psychology of regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(3), 314–327.
Author
Abhineeth Akkasale
A void